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Abstract
Although Bohr’s reply to the EPR argument is supposed to be a
watershed moment in the development of his philosophy of quantum
theory, it is difficult to find a clear statement of the reply’s philosoph-
ical point. Moreover, some have claimed that the point is simply that
Bohr is a radical positivist. In this paper, we show that such claims
are unfounded. In particular, we give a mathematically rigorous recon-
struction of Bohr’s reply to the original EPR argument that clarifies
its logical structure, and which shows that it does not rest on ques-
tionable philosophical assumptions. Rather, Bohr’s reply is dictated
by his commitment to provide “classical” and “objective” descriptions
of experimental phenomena.
1 Introduction
The past few decades have seen tremendous growth in our understanding of
interpretations of quantum mechanics. For example, a number of “no-go”
results have been obtained which show that some or other interpretation
violates constraints that we would expect any plausible interpretation of
quantum mechanics to satisfy. Thus, although there is no immediate hope of
convergence of opinion on interpretive issues, we certainly have an increased
understanding of the technical and conceptual issues at stake. Perhaps, then,
we can make use of this increased technical awareness to shed some new
light on the great old episodes in the conceptual development of quantum
mechanics.
∗Forthcoming in J. Butterfield and T. Placek, Modality, Probability, and Bell’s Theo-
rems.
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One historical episode of enduring philosophical interest is the debate
between Bohr and Einstein (along with Podolsky and Rosen) over the com-
pleteness of quantum mechanics. Although folklore has it that Bohr was the
victor in this debate, Fine and Beller [13] have recently claimed that Bohr’s
reply to the EPR argument of 1935 is basically a failure. In particular, Fine
and Beller claim that “. . . as a result of EPR, Bohr eventually turned from
his original concept of disturbance, to make a final — and somewhat forced
— landing in positivism” [13, p. 29]. They also make the stronger philo-
sophical claim that “. . . a positivistic shift is the only salvageable version
of Bohr’s reply” [13, p. 9]. Unfortunately, Fine and Beller did not see the
need to provide an argument for this claim. And, although we are willing
to concede — for purposes of argument — that the later Bohr embraced
positivism, we are not willing to concede that he was rationally compelled
to do so. In fact, we will argue that Bohr’s defense of the completeness of
quantum mechanics does not depend in any way on suspect philosophical
doctrines. To this end, we will supply a formal reconstruction of Bohr’s
reply to EPR, showing that his reply is dictated by the dual requirements
that any description of experimental data must be classical and objective.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide an
informal preliminary account of the EPR argument and of Bohr’s reply.
In Section 3, we consider some salient features of Bohr’s general outlook
on quantum theory. We then return to Bohr’s reply to EPR in Sections
4 and 5. In Section 4, we reconstruct Bohr’s reply to EPR in the case of
Bohm’s simplified spin version of the EPR experiment. Finally, in Section
5, we reconstruct Bohr’s reply to EPR in the case of the original (position-
momentum) version of the EPR experiment.
2 Informal Preview
In classical mechanics, a state description for a point particle includes a
precise specification of both its position and its momentum. In contrast,
a quantum-mechanical state description supplies only a statistical distribu-
tion over various position and momentum values. It would be quite natu-
ral, then, to regard the quantum-mechanical description as incomplete —
i.e. as providing less than the full amount of information about the parti-
cle. Bohr, however, insists that the imprecision in the quantum-mechanical
state description reflects a fundamental indeterminacy in nature rather than
the incompleteness of the theory. The EPR argument attempts to directly
rebut this completeness claim by showing that quantum mechanics (in con-
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junction with plausible extra-theoretical constraints) entails that particles
always have both a precise position and a precise momentum.
EPR ask us to consider a system consisting of a pair of spacelike sep-
arated particles. They then note that, according to quantum mechanics,
there is a state ψepr in which the positions of the two particles are strictly
correlated, and the momenta of the two particles are strictly correlated.
It follows then that if we were to measure the position of the first parti-
cle, we could predict with certainty the outcome of a position measurement
on the second particle; and if we were to measure the momentum of the
first particle, we could predict with certainty the outcome of a momentum
measurement on the second particle.
EPR then claim that our ability to predict with certainty the outcomes
of these measurements on the second particle shows that each such mea-
surement reveals a pre-existing “element of reality.” In what has come to
be know as the “EPR reality criterion,” they say:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a
physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity. [11, p. 77]
In particular, if we determine the position of the first particle in this strictly
correlated state, then we can conclude that the second particle also has a
definite position. And if we determine the momentum of the first particle
in this strictly correlated state, then the second particle must also have a
definite momentum.
Of course, it does not immediately follow that there is any single situ-
ation in which both the position and the momentum of the second particle
are elements of reality. However, EPR also make the (prima facie plausi-
ble) assumption that what counts as an element of reality for the second
particle should be independent of which measurement is performed on the
first particle. In other words, a measurement on the first particle can play a
probative, but not a constitutive, role with respect to the elements of reality
for the second particle. Consequently, EPR conclude that both the position
and the momentum of the second particle are elements of reality, regardless
of which measurement is performed on the first particle.
2.1 Bohr’s reply
According to Bohr, the EPR argument somehow misses the point about
the nature of quantum-mechanical description. Unfortunately, though, not
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much scholarly work has been done attempting to reconstruct Bohr’s reply
in a cogent fashion.
We should begin by noting that Bohr most certainly does not maintain
the “hyperpositivist” position according to which no possessed properties or
reality should be attributed to an unmeasured system. (For example, Ruark
claims that, for Bohr, “a given system has reality only when it is actually
measured” [24, 466].) Quite to the contrary, Bohr explicitly claims that
when the position of the first particle is measured, “. . . we obtain a basis for
conclusions about the initial position of the other particle relative to the rest
of the apparatus” [1, p. 148]. Thus, Bohr agrees with EPR that once the
position (respectively, momentum) of the first particle is actually measured,
the position of the second particle is an element of reality — whether or not
its position is actually empirically determined. In other words, Bohr accepts
the outcome of an application of the EPR reality criterion, so long as its
application is restricted to individual measurement contexts (i.e. the results
of its application in different contexts are not combined).
In order, then, to rationally reject EPR’s conclusion, Bohr must reject
the claim that elements of reality for the second particle cannot be con-
stituted by measurements carried out on the first particle. In other words,
Bohr believes that a measurement on the first particle can serve to constitute
elements of reality for the second, spacelike separated, particle.
To this point, we have not said anything particularly novel about Bohr’s
reply to EPR. It is relatively well-known that his reply amounts to claiming
— what EPR thought was absurd [11, p. 480] — that what is real with
respect to the second particle can depend in a nontrivial way on which
measurement is performed on the first particle. However, where previous
defenders of Bohr have uniformly stumbled is in giving a coherent account
of how a measurement on one system can influence what is real for some
spacelike separated system.
Unfortunately, Bohr’s statements on this issue are brief and obscure. For
example, he says,
It is true that in the measurements under consideration any di-
rect mechanical interaction of the [second] system and the mea-
suring agencies is excluded, but a closer examination reveals that
the procedure of measurement has an essential influence on the
conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities
in question rests. [2, p. 65]
That is, a measurement on the first system influences the conditions which
must obtain in order for us to “define” elements of reality for the second sys-
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tem. Moreover, this influence is of such a sort that a position (momentum)
measurement on the first particle supplies the conditions needed to define
the position (momentum) of the second particle.
Before we proceed to our positive account, we need first to dismiss one
prima facie plausible, but nonetheless mistaken, explication of Bohr’s no-
tion of defining a quantity. In particular, some have claimed that, according
to Bohr, an observable of a system comes to have a definite value when the
wavefunction of the system collapses onto one of that observable’s eigen-
states. This amounts to attributing to Bohr the claim that:
Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link: A quantity Q is defined in state ψ iff. ψ is an
eigenvector for Q;
along with the claim that by measuring an observable, we can cause the
quantum state to collapse onto an eigenstate of that observable. In that
case, Bohr would claim that by measuring the position of the first parti-
cle, we collapse the EPR state onto an eigenstate of position for the second
particle — and thereby “cause” the second particle to have a definite posi-
tion. Similarly, if we were to measure the momentum of the first particle, we
would “cause” the second particle to have a definite momentum. In either
case, the measurement on the first particle would be the cause of the reality
associated with the second particle.
However, there are at least two good reasons for rejecting this reading
of Bohr. First, Bohr explicitly claims that a measurement of the first par-
ticle cannot bring about a “mechanical” change in the second particle. In
philosophical terms, we might say that Bohr does not believe that the po-
sition measurement on the first particle causes the second particle to have
a position, at least not in the same sense that a brick can cause a window
to shatter. Thus, if Bohr does believe in a collapse the wavefunction, it is
as some sort of non-physical (perhaps epistemic) process. However, it is
our firm opinion that, unless the quantum state can be taken to represent
our ignorance of the “true” hidden state of the system, there is no coherent
non-physical interpretation of collapse. (We doubt the coherence of recent
attempts to maintain both a subjectivist interpretation of quantum prob-
abilities, and the claim that “there are no unknown quantum states” [7].)
Thus, if Bohr endorses collapse, then he is already committed to the incom-
pleteness of quantum mechanics, and the EPR argument is superfluous.
The second, and more important, reason for resisting this reading of
Bohr is the complete lack of textual evidence supporting the claim that
Bohr believed in wavefunction collapse (see [18]). Thus, there is no good
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reason to think that Bohr’s reply to the EPR argument depends in any way
on the notion of wavefunction collapse.
3 Classical Description and Appropriate Mixtures
In order to do justice to Bohr’s reply to EPR, it is essential that we avoid
caricatured views of Bohr’s general philosophical outlook, and of his in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics. This is particularly difficult, because
there has been a long history of misinterpretation of Bohr. For example, in
terms of general philosophical themes, one might find Bohr associated with
anti-realism, idealism, and subjectivism. Moreover, in terms of the specific
features of an interpretation of quantum mechanics, Bohr is often associated
with wavefunction collapse, creation of properties/attributes upon measure-
ment, and “cuts” between the microscopic and macroscopic realms. How-
ever, these characterizations of Bohr are pure distortion, and can find no jus-
tification in his published work. Indeed, Bohr’s philosophical commitments,
and the picture of quantum mechanics that arises from these commitments,
are radically different from the mythical version that we have received from
his critics and from his well-intended (but mistaken) followers. (Our own
understanding of Bohr has its most immediate precedent in recent work on
“no collapse” interpretations of quantum mechanics [4, 5, 6, 15]. However,
this sort of analysis of Bohr’s interpretation was suggested independently,
and much earlier, by Don Howard [16]. See also [17, 18].)
According to Bohr, the phenomena investigated by quantum theory can-
not be accounted for within the confines of classical physics. Nonetheless,
he claims that “. . . however far the phenomena transcend the scope of clas-
sical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in
classical terms” [3, p. 209]. That is, classical physics embodies a standard of
intelligibility that should be exemplified by any description of the empirical
evidence. In particular, although the various sources of evidence cannot be
reconciled into a single classical picture, the description of any single source
of evidence must be classical.
Bohr’s statements about the notion of “classical description” have been
horribly misunderstood. For a catalog of these misunderstandings and for
evidence that they are indeed mistaken, we refer the reader to [16, 17, 18].
On the positive side, we will follow Howard [17] in the claim that the notion
of classical description is best explicated via the notion of an “appropriate
mixture.”
. . . we make the clearest sense out of Bohr’s stress on the impor-
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tance of a classical account of experimental arrangements and of
the results of observation, if we understand a classical description
to be one in terms of appropriate mixtures. [17, p. 222]
As Howard [16] shows, the notion of an appropriate mixture can be devel-
oped in such a way that Bohr’s (sometimes obscure) statements about the
possibilities of classical description become mathematically clear statements
about the possibility of treating the quantum state as a classical probability
measure. In order to see this, we first collect some terminology.
Let H be a finite-dimensional vector space with inner-product 〈·, ·〉, and
let B(H) denote the family of linear operators on H. We say that a self-
adjoint operator W on H is a density operator just in case W has non-
negative eigenvalues that sum to 1. If ψ is a vector in H, we let |ψ〉〈ψ|
denote the projection onto the ray in H generated by ψ. Thus, if Tr denotes
the trace on B(H), then Tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|A) = 〈ψ,Aψ〉 for any operator A on H. A
measurement context can be represented by a pair (ψ,R), where ψ is a unit
vector (representing the quantum state), and R is a self-adjoint operator
(representing the measured observable).
Following Howard [16], we say that a “mixture,” represented by a density
operatorW , is appropriate for (ψ,R) just in caseW =
∑n
i=1 λi|φi〉〈φi|, (n ≤
dimH), where each φi is an eigenvector for R, and λi = |〈ψ, φi〉|2 for
i = 1, . . . , n. In other words, W is a mixture of eigenstates for R, and
it reproduces the probability distribution that ψ assigns to the values of
R. Thus, an appropriate mixture for (ψ,R) can be taken to represent our
ignorance of the value of R in the state ψ.
Once again, we emphasize that Bohr never explicitly invokes wavefunc-
tion collapse, nor does he need to. Indeed, the idea of a “measurement
problem” was foreign to Bohr, who seems to take it as a brute empirical
fact — needing no further explanation from within quantum theory — that
an observable possesses a value when it is measured. Of course, we now
know that if Bohr rejects collapse, then he would also have to reject the
claim that an observable possesses a value only if the system is in an eigen-
state for that observable (i.e., the eigenstate←eigenvalue link) [9]. But there
is little reason to believe that Bohr would have been tempted to endorse this
suspect claim in the first place.
3.1 Appropriate Mixtures and Elements of Reality
An appropriate mixture is supposed to give a description in which the mea-
sured observable is an “element of reality.” However, the connection between
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an appropriate mixture (i.e. some density operator) and elements of reality
is not completely clear. Clearly, the intent of writing the appropriate mix-
ture as W =
∑n
i=1 λi|φi〉〈φi| is that each “proposition” |φi〉〈φi| has a truth
value. However, if W is degenerate then W has infinitely many distinct ex-
pansions as a linear combination of orthogonal one-dimensional projections.
Thus, W itself does not determine the elements of reality; rather, it is some
expansion of W into a linear combination of one-dimensional projections
that determines the elements of reality.
In this case, however, we might as well focus on the one-dimensional
projections themselves. Thus, we will say that the set S = {|φi〉〈φi| : i =
1, . . . , n} is an appropriate event space for the measurement context (ψ,R)
just in case S is maximal relative to the following three conditions: (1.)
Each φi is an eigenvector of R; (2.) If i 6= j then φi and φj are orthog-
onal; (3.) Each φi is nonorthogonal to ψ. Each of these conditions has a
natural interpretation. The first condition states that each proposition in
S attributes some value to R (viz. the eigenvalue ri satisfying Rφi = riφi);
the second condition states that the propositions in S are mutually exclu-
sive; and the third condition states that each proposition in S is possible
relative to ψ. Note, moreover, that every appropriate event space S can
be obtained by taking the projection operators in some orthogonal expan-
sion W =
∑n
i=1 λi|φi〉〈φi| of an appropriate mixture for (ψ,R), and then
eliminating those projections with coefficient 0.
If we suppose that R possesses a definite value in the context (ψ,R)
(and that it is False that it possesses any other value) then an appropriate
event space S gives a minimal list of truth-valued propositions in the con-
text (ψ,R). However, Bohr himself is not an ontological minimalist; rather,
he claims that “we must strive continually to extend the scope of our de-
scription, but in such a way that our messages do not thereby lose their
objective and unambiguous character” [22, p. 10]. Thus, we should look for
the maximal set of propositions that can be consistently supposed to have
a truth-value in the context (ψ,R).
It has been pointed out (in relation to the modal interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics [8]) that we can consistently assume that all projections in
S⊥ are False. Moreover, if we do so, then our lattice of truth-valued proposi-
tions will be maximal; i.e. we cannot add further elements of reality without
violating the requirement of classical description. Thus, given an appropri-
ate event space S, we will take the full family of truth-valued propositions
to be those in the set (cf. [8]):
Def(S) :=
{
P 2 = P = P ∗ : ∀Q ∈ S [Q ≤ P or QP = 0]
}
.
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It is straightforward to verify that Def(S) is a sublattice of the lattice of
all projection operators on H. Moreover, it can be shown that Def(S) is
maximal in the following sense: If L is a lattice of projections such that
Def(S) ⊂ L, then ψ cannot be represented as a classical probability distri-
bution over all elements in L. (In this section and the next, we state results
without proof. Each of these results is a corollary of the results proved in
[15].)
4 Bohr’s Reply: Spin Case
We can now make use of the appropriate mixtures account to reconstruct
Bohr’s reply to EPR. For the sake of mathematical simplicity, we first con-
sider Bohm’s spin version of the EPR experiment. We return to the original
EPR experiment in the final section.
Suppose that we have prepared an ensemble of spin-1/2 particles in the
singlet state:
ψ =
1√
2
( |x+〉|x−〉 − |x−〉|x+〉 ), (1)
where σx|x±〉 = ±|x±〉. Then, σx⊗ I is strictly anticorrelated with I ⊗σx,
and σy ⊗ I is strictly anticorrelated with I ⊗ σy. Thus, the outcome of a
measurement of σx⊗I would permit us to predict with certainty the outcome
of a measurement of I ⊗ σx; and the outcome of a measurement of σy ⊗ I
would permit us to predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement of
I ⊗ σy.
For any orthonormal basis {φi} of eigenvectors for σx⊗I, the event space
{ |φi〉〈φi| : |〈ψ, φi〉|2 6= 0}, (2)
is appropriate for (ψ, σx ⊗ I). However, since σx ⊗ I is degenerate, there
are infinitely many distinct orthonormal bases of eigenvectors for σx ⊗ I.
Moreover, each basis gives rise to a distinct event space, and each distinct
event space permits us to attribute different elements of reality to the second
(unmeasured) particle.
More concretely, let P x± denote the projection onto the ray generated by
|x±〉, and similarly for P y± and P z±. Then, each of the following event spaces
is appropriate for (ψ, σx ⊗ I):
Sxx = {P x+ ⊗ P x− , P x− ⊗ P x+}.
Sxy = {P x+ ⊗ P y+ , P x+ ⊗ P y− , P x− ⊗ P y+ , P x− ⊗ P y−}.
Sxz = {P x+ ⊗ P z+ , P x+ ⊗ P z− , P x− ⊗ P z+ , P x− ⊗ P z−}.
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Clearly, though, these event spaces give theoretically inequivalent descrip-
tions of the measurement context. While Sxx gives a description in which
the second particle has spin-x values that are perfectly anticorrelated with
the spin-x values of the first particle, Sxy gives a description in which the
second particle has spin-y values that are uncorrelated with the spin-x values
of the first particle. How do we determine which description is the correct
one?
One might be inclined to argue that it is an advantage to have more than
one “interpretation” (i.e. empirically adequate description) of the same mea-
surement context. That is, one might argue that there is no single correct
description of the second particle in this context; rather, there are several
incompatible, but individually acceptable, descriptions of the second parti-
cle. However — despite his otherwise unorthodox philosophical stance —
Bohr is not a pluralist about descriptions of measurement contexts. Indeed,
he claims that a measurement context uniquely dictates an interpretation.
. . . we are not dealing with an incomplete description character-
ized by the arbitrary picking out of different elements of reality
at the cost of sacrificing other such elements, but with a ra-
tional discrimination between essentially different experimental
arrangements and procedures. . . . [1, p. 148]
Thus, the theorist is not free to make a willy-nilly choice of which elements
of reality to ascribe to the second particle; rather, her choice is to be fixed
(in some, yet to be explicated, way) by the measurement context.
For Bohr, the correct description of the present measurement context (in
which spin-x is measured on the first particle and no measurement is per-
formed on the second particle) is Sxx, where the two particles have perfectly
anticorrelated spin-x values. However, we do not yet have any explanation
for why Bohr thinks that this description is privileged. In the next two
sections, we shall provide an explanation for Bohr’s preference.
4.1 The EPR reality criterion
Isn’t it obvious that Sxx is the correct description of the context in which
σx ⊗ I is measured in the EPR state? In particular, if we know that σx ⊗ I
has some value (either +1 or −1) can we not infer immediately that I ⊗ σx
has the opposite value? But what reason do we have to think that I⊗σx has
any value at all? Since we are refusing to invoke wavefunction collapse, it
does not help to note that Lu¨ders’ rule entails that a measurement of σx⊗ I
collapses ψ onto either |x+〉|x−〉 or |x−〉|x+〉. Perhaps then our intuition
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that I⊗σx has a value is based on some variant of the EPR reality criterion:
If we can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement of I ⊗ σx,
then it must possess a value.
According to Howard, it is a contextualized version of the EPR reality
criterion that dictates which properties Bohr attributes to the second (un-
measured) particle. Howard says, “. . . there is no obvious reason why, with
the added necessary condition of a restriction to specific experimental con-
texts, [Bohr] could not accept the EPR reality criterion as it stands” [16,
p. 256]. He then spells out concretely what such a contextualized version of
the reality criterion would require.
Once the experimental context is stipulated, which amounts to
the specification of the candidates for real status, our decision
as to which particular properties to consider as real will turn on
the question of predictability with certainty. [16, p. 256]
We will now give a formal description of this notion of a contextualized
reality criterion.
First, when Howard says that the experimental context specifies the
“candidates” for real status, he presumably means that an observable must
be compatible with the measured observable in order to be such a candidate.
For example, if we measure σx ⊗ I, then σy ⊗ I is not even a candidate for
real status. However, in order for the quantum state ψ to be representable
as a classical probability distribution over two projections P and P ′, it is not
necessary for P and P ′ to be compatible. Rather, ψ can be represented as
a classical probability distribution over P and P ′ if and only if [P,P ′]ψ = 0.
Thus, since we wish to maintain that each spectral projection of R has a
truth-value in the context (ψ,R), we will say that a property P is a candidate
for real status just in case [P,P ′]ψ = 0 for every spectral projection P ′ of
R.
However, since compatibility (or compatibility relative to a state) is not
transitive, not every observable that is compatible with the measured ob-
servable can be an element of reality. For example, both I ⊗ σx and I ⊗ σy
are compatible with σx⊗ I, but it is not possible for both I ⊗σx and I ⊗σy
to be elements of reality. Thus, we need a criterion that will permit us to
choose among the candidates for real status in such a way that we do not
end up with a set of properties that cannot be described classically.
According to Howard, “our decision as to which particular properties to
consider as real will turn on the question of predictability with certainty.” In
other words, P is real only if it is strictly correlated with one of the possible
outcomes of a measurement of R; i.e. there is some spectral projection P ′
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of R such that P and P ′ are strictly correlated in the state ψ. That is,
〈ψ, (P − P ′)2ψ〉 = 0, which is equivalent to Pψ = P ′ψ.
Let R denote the family of spectral projections for R. Then Howard’s
proposal amounts to attributing reality to the following set of properties in
the context (ψ,R):
L(ψ,R) :=
{
P 2 = P = P ∗ : [P,R]ψ = 0 & ∃P ′ ∈ R s.t. P ′ψ = Pψ
}
.
We leave the following straightforward verifications to the reader: (1.) L(ψ,R)
is a sublattice of the lattice of all projections on H. (2.) The quantum state
|ψ〉〈ψ| is a mixture of dispersion-free states on L(ψ,R). (For this, recall
that it is sufficient to show that [P,Q]ψ = 0 for all P,Q ∈ L(ψ,R).) (3.)
I ⊗ P x± ∈ L(ψ, σx ⊗ I) and I ⊗ P y± 6∈ L(ψ, σx ⊗ I); and similarly with the
roles of x and y interchanged.
Thus, the contextualized reality criterion accurately reproduces Bohr’s
pronouncements on the EPR experiment. However, there is a serious dif-
ficulty with this analysis of Bohr’s reply. In particular, the EPR reality
criterion is best construed as a version of “inference to the best explana-
tion” (cf. [23, p. 72]): The best explanation of our ability to predict the
outcome of a measurement with certainty is that the system has some pre-
existing feature that we are detecting. However, since Bohr is not a classical
scientific realist (see, e.g., [16]), we cannot expect him to be persuaded by
such inferences to the best explanation. Thus, although Howard’s contex-
tualized reality criterion gives the right answers, it fails to give a plausible
explanation of why Bohr gave the answers he did.
4.2 Objectivity and invariance
Despite Bohr’s rejection of classical scientific realism, he maintains that our
descriptions of experimental phenomena must be “objective.” Presumably,
Bohr’s notion of objectivity is to some extent derivative from the idealist
philosophical tradition, and therefore has philosophical subtleties that go
far beyond the scope of this paper. For our present purposes, however,
it will suffice to use a straightforward and clear notion of objectivity that
Bohr might have endorsed: For a feature of a system to be objective, that
feature must be invariant under the “relevant” group of symmetries. We
now explicate this notion, and we show that it dictates a unique classical
description of the EPR experiment.
Recall that the event space Sxy = {P x+⊗P y+, P x+⊗P y−, P x−⊗P y+, P x−⊗P y−}
allows us to describe an ensemble in which the first particle has spin-x values,
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and second particle has (uncorrelated) spin-y values. Now, consider the
symmetry U of the system defined by the following mapping of orthonormal
bases:
|y+〉|y+〉 7−→ +|z−〉|z−〉
|y+〉|y−〉 7−→ −|z−〉|z+〉
|y+〉|y−〉 7−→ −|z−〉|z+〉
|y−〉|y−〉 7−→ +|z+〉|z+〉.
Then, U∗(σx⊗ I)U = σx⊗ I, and Uψ = ψ. That is, U leaves both the state
and the measured observable of the context invariant. However,
U∗(P x± ⊗ P y±)U = P x± ⊗ P z±.
That is, U does not leave the individual elements of Sxy, nor even the set as
a whole, invariant. In fact, there is no quantum state that is dispersion-free
on both P x+ ⊗ P y+ and on its transform U∗(P x+ ⊗ P y+)U = P x+ ⊗ P z+. Thus,
the candidate elements of reality in Sxy are not left invariant by the relevant
class of symmetries.
In general, let us say that a set S of projections on H is definable in
terms of ψ and R just in case: For any unitary operator U on H, if Uψ = ψ
and U∗RU = R then U∗PU = P for all P ∈ S. It is straightforward to
verify that the set Sxx = {P x+ ⊗ P x− , P x− ⊗ P x+} is definable in terms of ψ
and R. In fact, it is the only such appropriate event space for this context.
Theorem 1. {P x+ ⊗ P x− , P x− ⊗ P x+} is the unique appropriate event space
for (ψ, σx ⊗ I) that is definable in terms of ψ and σx ⊗ I.
Proof. Suppose that S is an appropriate event space for (ψ,R) that is defin-
able in terms of ψ and R, and let |φ〉〈φ| ∈ S. Let P1 = (P x+⊗P x−)+(P x−⊗P x+)
and let P2 = (P
x
+⊗P x+)+ (P x−⊗P x−). Then U := P1−P2 is a unitary opera-
tor. It is obvious that U∗(σx⊗I)U = σx⊗I and Uψ = ψ. Thus, definability
entails that |φ〉〈φ| commutes with U ; and therefore |φ〉〈φ| is either a subpro-
jection of P1 or is a subprojection of P2. However, the latter is not possible
since P2ψ = 0. Thus, |φ〉〈φ| is a subprojection of P1. However, there are
only two one-dimensional subprojections of P1 that are compatible with R,
namely P x+ ⊗ P x− and P x− ⊗ P x+. Since |φ〉〈φ| must be compatible with R it
follows that either |φ〉〈φ| = P x+ ⊗ P x− or |φ〉〈φ| = P x− ⊗ P x+.
Thus, we have a situation analogous to simultaneity relative to an iner-
tial frame in relativity theory. In that case, there is only one simultaneity
relation that is invariant under all symmetries that preserve an inertial ob-
server’s worldline [20]. Thus, we might wish to regard this simultaneity
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relation as the correct one relative to that observer, and the others as spu-
rious. In the quantum-mechanical case, there is only one set of properties
that is invariant under all the symmetries that preserve the quantum state
and the measured observable. So, we should regard these properties as those
that possess values relative to that measurement context.
It is easy to see that L(ψ, σx⊗I) = Def(Sxx). Thus Howard’s suggestion
of applying a contextualized reality criterion turns out to be (extensionally)
equivalent to requiring that the elements of reality be definable in terms of
ψ and R. It follows that those attracted by Howard’s analysis of Bohr’s
response to EPR now have independent grounds to think that L(ψ, σx ⊗ I)
gives the correct list of elements of reality in the context (ψ, σx ⊗ I).
5 Bohr’s Reply: Position-Momentum Case
There are a couple of formal obstacles that we encounter in attempting to
reconstruct Bohr’s reply to the original EPR argument. First, there is an
obstacle in describing the EPR experiment itself: The EPR state suppos-
edly assigns dispersion-free values to the relative position Q1 − Q2 and to
the total momentum P1 + P2 of the two particles. However, Q1 − Q2 and
P1 + P2 are continuous spectrum observables, and no standard quantum
state (i.e., density operator) assigns a dispersion-free value to a continuous
spectrum observable. Thus, in terms of the standard mathematical formal-
ism for quantum mechanics, the EPR state does not exist. Second, there is
an obstacle in applying the account of appropriate mixtures to the EPR ex-
periment: Since the position (or momentum) observable of the first particle
has a continuous spectrum, no density operator W is a convex combination
of dispersion-free states of the measured observable. Thus, there are no
appropriate mixtures (in our earlier sense) for this measurement context.
We can overcome both of these obstacles by expanding the state space
of our system so that it includes eigenstates for continuous spectrum ob-
servables. To do this rigorously, we will employ the C∗-algebraic formalism
of quantum theory. We first recall the basic elements of this formalism.
A C∗-algebra A is a complex Banach space with norm A 7→ ‖A‖, invo-
lution A 7→ A∗, and a product A,B 7→ AB satisfying:
(AB)∗ = B∗A∗, ‖A∗A‖ = ‖A‖2, ‖AB‖ ≤ ‖A‖‖B‖. (3)
We assume that A has a two-sided identity I. Let ω be a linear functional
on A. We say that ω is a state just in case ω is positive [i.e. ω(A∗A) ≥ 0 for
all A ∈ A], and ω is normalized [i.e. ω(I) = 1]. A state ω is said to be pure
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just in case: If ω = λρ+ (1− λ)τ where ρ, τ are states of A and λ ∈ (0, 1),
then ω = ρ = τ . A state ω is said to be dispersion-free on A ∈ A just in
case ω(A∗A) = |ω(A)|2. If ω is dispersion-free on A for all A ∈ A, we say
that ω is dispersion-free on the algebra A.
We represent a measurement context by a pair (ω,R), where ω is a state
of A, and R is a mutually commuting family of operators in A (representing
the measured observables). We are interested now in determining which
families of observables can be described classically as possessing values in
the state ω. Thus, if B is a C∗-subalgebra of A, we say that ω|B (i.e., the
restriction of ω to B) is a classical probability measure (or more briefly,
classical) just in case
ω(A) =
∫
ωλ(A)dµ(λ), A ∈ B, (4)
where each ωλ is a dispersion-free state of B.
We now construct a specific C∗-algebra that provides the model for a
single particle with one degree of freedom. In the standard Hilbert space
description of a single particle, we can take our state space to be the Hilbert
space L2(R) of (equivalence classes of) square-integrable functions from R
into C. The position observable can be represented by the self-adjoint oper-
ator Q defined by Qψ(x) = x · ψ(x) (on a dense domain in L2(R)), and
the momentum observable can be represented by the self-adjoint opera-
tor P = −i(d/dx) (also defined on a dense domain in L2(R)). (We set
~ = 1 throughout.) We may then define one-parameter unitary groups
by setting Ua := exp{iaQ} for a ∈ R, and Vb := exp{ibP} for b ∈ R.
Let A[R2] denote the C∗-subalgebra of operators on L2(R) generated by
{Ua : a ∈ R} ∪ {Vb : b ∈ R}. We call A[R2] the Weyl algebra for one degree
of freedom.
Of course, A[R2] itself does not contain either Q or P . However, the
group {Ua : a ∈ R} can be thought of as a surrogate for Q, in the sense that a
state ω ofA[R2] should be thought of as an “eigenstate” forQ just in case ω is
dispersion-free on the set {Ua : a ∈ R}. Similarly, the group {Vb : b ∈ R} can
be thought of as a surrogate for P . (Moreover, the indeterminacy relation
between Q and P can be formulated rigorously as follows: There is no state
of A[R2] that is simultaneously dispersion-free on both {Ua : a ∈ R} and
{Vb : b ∈ R} [10, p. 455].)
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5.1 Formal model of the EPR experiment
In the standard formalism, the state space of a pair of particles (each with
one degree of freedom) can be taken as the tensor product Hilbert space
L2(R) ⊗ L2(R). Similarly, in the C∗-algebraic formalism, the algebra of
observables for a pair of particles (each with one degree of freedom) can be
represented as the tensor product A[R2]⊗A[R2].
The EPR state is supposed to be that state in which Q1 − Q2 has the
value λ, and P1 + P2 has the value µ. (At present, we have no guarantee
of either existence or uniqueness.) Since exp{ia(Q1 − Q2)} = Ua ⊗ U−a
and exp{ib(P1 + P2)} = Vb ⊗ Vb, and since dispersion-free states preserve
functional relations, the EPR state should assign the (dispersion-free) value
eiaλ to Ua ⊗ U−a and the value eibµ to Vb ⊗ Vb. Fortunately, for a fixed pair
(λ, µ) of real numbers, there is a unique pure state ω of A[R2]⊗A[R2] that
satisfies these two conditions [14, Theorem 1]. We will simply call ω the
EPR state.
Suppose then that we are in a context in which all elements in Q1 :=
{Ua⊗ I : a ∈ R} can be assigned definite numerical (complex) values (e.g., a
context in which the position of the first particle has been determined). We
can then ask: Which observables can be consistently described, along with
the elements of Q1, as possessing values in the state ψ? Since the elements
of Q2 := {I ⊗ Ua : a ∈ R} commute pairwise with the elements of Q1,
we could provide a consistent description in which the second particle has a
definite position (that is strictly correlated with the first particle’s position).
However, since the elements of P2 := {I⊗Va : a ∈ R} also commute pairwise
with the elements of Q1, we could provide a consistent description in which
the second particle has a definite momentum (which is uncorrelated with
the position of the first particle). The requirement of consistency does not
itself tell us which of these descriptions is the correct one. In order to find
a basis for choosing between the descriptions, we turn again to symmetry
considerations.
Let A,B be C∗-algebras, and let pi be a mapping of A into B. We say
that pi is a ∗-homomorphism just in case pi is linear, multiplicative, and
preserves adjoints. If pi is also a bijection, we say that pi is a ∗-isomorphism;
and we say that pi is a ∗-automorphism when we wish to indicate that B
was already assumed to be isomorphic to A. Finally, let ω be a state of
A, let R be a mutually commuting family of operators in A, and let B be
a C∗-subalgebra of A. We that B is definable in terms of ω and R just in
case: For any ∗-automorphism α of A, if α(R) = R and ω ◦ α = ω, then
α(B) = B. Thus, in our present circumstance, we wish to determine which
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(if any) of the candidate algebras of “elements of reality” identified above is
definable in terms of the EPR state and the measured observables Q1.
5.2 The uniqueness theorem
We turn now to the main technical result of our paper. Our main result
shows that there is a unique (subject to the constraint of maximality) algebra
of observables B such that: (1.) It is consistent to suppose that all elements
of B possess a definite value in the EPR state; (2.) The position observable
of the first particle (more precisely: its surrogate unitary group) lies in B;
and (3.) B is left invariant by all symmetries that leave the EPR state and
the position of the first particle invariant. Furthermore, we show that these
requirements alone entail that the second particle also has a definite position.
We take this result as demonstrating that if the position of the first particle
is assumed to be definite, then the only invariant classical description is one
in which the second particle also has a definite position.
Theorem 2. Let ω be the EPR state. There is a unique subalgebra B of
A[R2]⊗A[R2] that is maximal with respect to the three conditions:
1. ω|B is a classical probability distribution;
2. Q1 ⊆ B;
3. B is definable in terms of ω and Q1.
Moreover, it follows that:
4. Q2 ⊆ B.
By symmetry, the result also holds if we replace Qi with Pi throughout the
statement of the theorem.
For the proof of the theorem, we will need to invoke two technical lem-
mas. First, let B(H) denote the algebra of bounded linear operators on
the Hilbert space H. If B is a subset of B(H), we let B′ denote the set of
all operators in B(H) that commute with each operator in B, and we let
B′′ = (B′)′.
Lemma 1. Let B be a C∗-algebra of operators acting on H. Let Ut =
exp{−itH}, where H is a bounded self-adjoint operator acting on H. If
UtBU−t = B for all t ∈ R, then there is a one-parameter unitary group
{Vt : t ∈ R} ⊆ B′′ such that UtAU−t = VtAV−t for all A ∈ B and t ∈ R.
Proof. See Theorem 4.1.15 of [25].
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Lemma 2. Let A be a C∗-algebra, let ω be a state of A, and let (pi,H,Ω) be
the GNS representation of A induced by ω [19, p. 279]. Suppose that α is a
∗-automorphism of A such that ω ◦α = ω. Then there is a unitary operator
U on H such that UΩ = Ω and Upi(A)U∗ = pi(α(A)) for all A ∈ A.
Proof. See Proposition 7.4.12 of [21].
Proof. Proof of the Theorem Let A = A[R2]⊗A[R2]. By the GNS construc-
tion (see [19, Thm. 4.5.2]), there is a Hilbert space H, a unit vector Ω ∈ H,
and a ∗-homomorphism pi from A into B(H) such that
ω(A) = 〈Ω, pi(A)Ω〉, A ∈ A. (5)
Since A is simple, pi is a ∗-isomorphism. Thus, we can suppress reference to
pi, and suppose that A is given as a C∗-algebra of operators acting on H. We
will need to make frequent use of the following result: For any subalgebra
B of A, ω|B is a classical probability distribution if and only if [A,B]Ω = 0
for all A,B ∈ B [15, Prop. 2.2].
Our proof now splits into two parts: (I.) We show that if a subalgebra of
A maximally satisfies conditions 1.–3. of the theorem, then it also satisfies
condition 4. (II.) We show that there is a unique subalgebra of A, viz.,
FΩ ∩A (to be defined later), that maximally satisfies 1.–4. To finish off the
argument, we note that if B is any subalgebra of A satisfying 1.–3., then
(by an application of Zorn’s lemma) it is contained in an algebra C that
maximally satisfies 1.–3., and hence also maximally satisfies 1.–4., in virtue
of part (I.). Thus, by part (II.), C = FΩ ∩A, and B ⊆ FΩ ∩A, establishing
that the latter is also the unique subalgebra of A maximally satisfying just
1.–3.
(I.) Suppose that B is a C∗-subalgebra of A that maximally satisfies
conditions 1.–3. of the theorem. We wish to show that I ⊗ Ua ∈ B for all
a ∈ R. If we set
A := (1/2)[(I ⊗ Ua) + (I ⊗ U−a)], (6)
B := (i/2)[(I ⊗ U−a)− (I ⊗ Ua)], (7)
then A+ iB = I ⊗ Ua. Thus, it will suffice to show that A,B ∈ B. We will
treat the case of A; the case of B can be dealt with by a similar argument.
Let
A′ = (1/2)[e−iaλ(Ua ⊗ I) + eiaλ(U−a ⊗ I)]. (8)
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A straightforward calculation (using the definition of the EPR state ω and
the fact ω(Ua⊗Ub) = 0 if b 6= −a [14, Eqn. 19]) shows that ω((A′−A)∗(A′−
A)) = 0. Thus, in the GNS representation,
‖(A′ −A)Ω‖2 = 〈(A′ −A)Ω, (A′ −A)Ω〉 (9)
= 〈Ω, (A′ −A)∗(A′ −A)Ω〉 = 0. (10)
Let H = A′ − A and let Ut = exp{−itH} for all t ∈ R. We claim now that
if Ut ∈ B for all t ∈ R then A ∈ B. Indeed, suppose that Ut ∈ B for all
t ∈ R. Since limt→0 ‖iH − t−1(Ut − I)‖ = 0, and since A is closed in the
norm topology, it follows that H ∈ B. Moreover, since A = H − A′ and
A′ ∈ B, it follows that A ∈ B. Thus, it will suffice to show that Ut ∈ B for
all t ∈ R.
For each t ∈ R, define a ∗-automorphism αt of A by setting αt(Z) =
UtZU−t for all Z ∈ A. Since HΩ = (A′ − A)Ω = 0, it follows that UtΩ =
exp{−itH}Ω = Ω for all t ∈ R. Thus,
ω(αt(Z)) = 〈Ω, UtZU−tΩ〉 = 〈Ω, ZΩ〉 = ω(Z), (11)
for all Z ∈ A. Moreover, αt(X) = UtXU−t = X for all X ∈ R. Since B is
definable in terms of R and ω, it follows that UtBU−t = αt(B) = B for all
t ∈ R. Thus, Lemma 1 entails that there is a unitary group {Vt : t ∈ R} ⊆ B′′
such that UtZU−t = VtZV−t for all Z ∈ B and t ∈ R. Since ω|B′′ is classical
(see [15, Cor. 2.9]), and since Z, V−t ∈ B′′, we have
UtZU−tΩ = VtZV−tΩ = VtV−tZΩ = ZΩ. (12)
Thus, [Ut, Z]Ω = 0 for all t ∈ R.
Let [BΩ] denote the closed linear span of BΩ = {Y Ω : Y ∈ B}, and let P
denote the orthogonal projection onto [BΩ]. Then P ∈ B′ = (B′′)′, and B′′P
is a von Neumann algebra acting on [BΩ] [19, Prop. 5.5.6]. Let BΩ denote
the subalgebra of B(H) given by
BΩ = (I − P )B(H)(I − P )⊕B′′P. (13)
In order to complete the first part of the proof, we show (a.) B = BΩ ∩ A,
and (b.) Ut ∈ BΩ ∩A for all t ∈ R.
(a.) Recall that B was assumed to be maximal with respect to conditions
1.–3. of the theorem. Since B ⊆ BΩ ∩A, it will follow that B = BΩ ∩A if it
can be shown that BΩ ∩ A satisfies conditions 1. and 3.
We first show that ω|BΩ∩A is a classical probability distribution. Since
ω|B is classical, and ω is a normal state in the representation, it follows that
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ω|B′′ is classical. Thus, B′′P is abelian [15, Prop. 2.2], and ω|BΩ is classical
[15, Thm. 2.8]. Therefore ω|BΩ∩A is classical.
We now show that BΩ ∩ A is definable in terms of R and ω. Let α
be a ∗-automorphism of A such that α(R) = R and ω ◦ α = ω. Since
B is definable in terms of R and ω, α(B) = B. By Lemma 2, there is a
unitary operator U on H such that UΩ = Ω and α(X) = UXU∗ for all
X ∈ A. In particular, UBU∗ = B and by continuity UB′′U∗ = B′′. For
any Z ∈ B, U(ZΩ) = UZU∗Ω ∈ [BΩ] and therefore [U,P ] = 0. Thus,
U(ZP )U∗ = (UZU∗)P ∈ B′′P for any Z ∈ B′′. Thus, UBΩU∗ = BΩ, and
α(BΩ ∩ A) = U(BΩ ∩ A)U∗ = BΩ ∩ A. Therefore BΩ ∩ A is definable in
terms of R and ω.
(b.) We now show that Ut ∈ BΩ ∩ A for all t ∈ R. Clearly Ut ∈ A since
Ut = exp{−itH} andH is a finite linear combination of elements in {Ua⊗Ub :
a, b ∈ R}. Now, for any Z ∈ B, we have shown that UtZΩ = ZUtΩ = ZΩ.
Thus, Ut acts like the identity on the subspace [BΩ] of H. If P is again used
to denote the orthogonal projection onto [BΩ], then UtP = P ∈ B′′P ; and
therefore Ut ∈ BΩ.
(II.) We prove that there is a unique subalgebra of A that maximally
satisfies conditions 1.–4. of the theorem. This result turns on the following
key fact: For any representation (pi,H) of A, the von Neumann algebra
pi({Ua ⊗ Ub : a, b ∈ R})′′ is maximal abelian in B(H) [12, Thm. I.6]. Thus,
in our present notation (suppressing the representation mapping), {Ua⊗Ub :
a, b ∈ R}′′ is maximal abelian.
Let F = {Ua⊗Ub : a, b ∈ R}, and let P denote the orthogonal projection
onto [FΩ]. Since F leaves [FΩ] invariant, P ∈ F ′. Let FΩ denote the
subalgebra of B(H) given by
FΩ = (I − P )B(H)(I − P )⊕F ′′P. (14)
It is clear that F ⊆ FΩ ∩A. Thus, FΩ ∩A satisfies conditions 2. and 4. of
the theorem. Since F ′′P is abelian, FΩ∩A satisfies 1. [15, Prop. 2.2]. And,
since FΩ ∩A is constructed out of elements invariant under automorphisms
that preserve the EPR state and Q1, it satisfies 3. For maximality, we must
show that FΩ ∩ A contains any other subalgebra B ⊆ A satisfying 1.–4.
By hypothesis, B is a subalgebra of A such that ω|B is classical and
F ⊆ B. (Henceforth, we shall not actually need B’s satisfaction of condition
3.) Then, ω|B′′ is classical and F ′′ ⊆ B′′. Since F ′′ is maximal abelian,
F ′′ = F ′. Thus, P ∈ F ′ = F ′′ ⊆ B′′. Let A be an arbitrary element of B.
Then, AΩ = APΩ = PAΩ since A,P ∈ B′′ and since ω|B′′ is classical. Thus,
A leaves [FΩ] invariant, and A = (I − P )A(I − P ) +AP . Furthermore, for
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any R ∈ F ′′, [AP,RP ] = 0. Since F ′′P is a maximal abelian subalgebra of
PB(H)P , it follows that AP ∈ F ′′P . Therefore, A ∈ FΩ ∩ A. Since A was
an arbitrary element of B, it follows that B ⊆ FΩ ∩ A.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that Bohr’s reply to EPR is a logical consequence of four
requirements: (1.) Empirical Adequacy: When an observable is measured,
it possesses some value in accordance with the probabilities determined by
the quantum state. (2.) Classical Description: Properties P and P ′ can be
simultaneously real in a quantum state only if that state can be represented
as a joint classical probability distribution over P and P ′. (3.) Objectivity:
Elements of reality must be invariants of those symmetries that preserve
the defining features of the measurement context. (4.) Maximality: Our
description should be maximal, subject to the prior three constraints. Obvi-
ously, these requirements have nothing to do with the verifiability criterion
of meaning or with other central positivistic doctrines. Thus, Bohr’s reply
to EPR does not require a shift towards positivism.
Nonetheless, our reconstruction of Bohr’s reply does not in itself consti-
tute an argument for the superiority of Bohr’s point of view over EPR’s more
“realist” point of view, which rejects the claim that the reality of a system
can be constituted “from a distance.” However, we wish to emphasize that
Bohr is not so much concerned with what is truly real for the distant system
as he is with the question of what we would be warranted in asserting about
the distant system from the standpoint of classical description. In particu-
lar, Bohr argues that in certain measurement contexts we are warranted in
attributing certain elements of reality to distant (unmeasured) systems. He
also claims, however, that if we attempt to make context-independent attri-
butions of reality to these distant systems, then we will come into conflict
with the experimental record.
Moreover, as Bohr himself might have claimed, a similar sort of context-
dependence already arises in special relativity. In particular, an inertial
observer is warranted in saying that any two events that are orthogonal to
his worldline at some worldpoint are simultaneous. However, if we attempt
to make context-independent attributions of simultaneity to distant events
— where the “context” is now set by the observer’s frame of reference —
then we will run into conflicts with the experimental record.
Of course, a proper defense of Bohr’s point of view would require much
more space than we have here. However, we have supplied ample justification
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for the claim that Bohr’s reply to EPR — and his philosophy of quantum
theory in general — deserves a more fair treatment than it has recently
received.
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